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Abstract 
The success of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) worldwide has led to an accumulation of 
frozen embryos that are surplus to the reproductive needs of those for whom they were created. In 
these situations, couples must decide whether to discard them or donate them for scientific 
research or for use by other infertile couples. While legislation and regulation may limit the decisions 
that couples make, their decisions are often shaped by their religious beliefs. Unfortunately, health 
professionals, scientists and policy-makers are often unaware of the way in which faith traditions 
view ART and decisions concerning the ‘fate’ of surplus embryos. In this paper scholars representing 
six major religious traditions provide a commentary on a hypothetical case concerning the donation 
or destruction of excess ART embryos. These commentaries provide a rich account of religious 
perspectives on the status of the human embryo and an insight into the relevance of faith to health 
and policy decisions, particularly in reproductive medicine, ART and embryo research. 
The increasing availability and utilization of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has led to an 
accumulation of frozen embryos that are surplus or excess to the needs of those for whom they 
were created within fertility clinics worldwide. Couples who have succeeded in becoming parents 
and have no further desire to reproduce are then faced with a difficult choice about the use of their 
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frozen embryos – to discard them, or donate them either for scientific research or for use by other 
infertile couples. 
 
While relevant legislation and regulation may guide (or limit) the options open to couples in this 
situation, other considerations may influence the decision that couples make, including the desire to 
avoid regret, to advance scientific knowledge, to avoid ‘wasting’ embryos and to help other infertile 
couples, and to act in accordance with their beliefs regarding the value and appropriate ends and 
means of scientific research, and the moral status and potentiality of embryos.1−3 Each of these 
considerations may, in turn, be shaped by the beliefs, values and practices of a couple's faith 
community. In light of this, it is important that health professionals, scientists and policy-makers are 
aware of the ways that religious beliefs and practices may impact upon decisions to donate or 
destroy embryos and develop an understanding of the principal differences between, and within, 
the major religious traditions with respect to the status of the human embryo. 
To this end, we solicited commentaries on a hypothetical case from scholars representing six major 
religious traditions. The commentaries do not attempt to exhaustively survey the relevant discourse 
or views within these traditions, and other members of these traditions may well draw alternative 
conclusions from the same or different authoritative sources. The commentaries do, however, offer 
the considered responses of leading experts from each religious tradition and each are grounded in 
the key texts and in scholarly and popular interpretations of the respective doctrines. 
 
Robert and Sue are the parents of three healthy children, all conceived following in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). After many years of coping with infertility, they feel that they have now completed their family 
and do not wish to have any more children. They have four embryos remaining in cryopreservation 
(frozen storage). Their obstetrician offers them three choices: disposing of the embryos that they 
judge to be excess to their needs; donating the embryos to another couple; or donating the embryos 
for research. They are also advised that their embryos cannot remain cryopreserved indefinitely and 
that they will be destroyed after five years according to legislation in their state. 
 Sue, in particular, finds this a terrible decision to have to make, as she feels a great deal of 
responsibility for her embryos and is acutely aware that her children – Tom, Jessica and Elise – were 
all once embryos themselves. She and Robert discuss donating the remaining embryos for research 
as they do not feel comfortable either destroying the embryos or donating them to other couples. 
Sue is particularly interested in donating them for research into infertility to help others who want to 
have children and are facing the difficulties that she and Robert experienced. They are uncertain, 
however, how a decision to donate their embryos for this type of research, which destroys the 
embryos in the course of experimentation, would be viewed within the context of their faith. 
 
A Buddhist perspective 
Professor Damien Keown is Professor of Buddhist Ethics at Goldsmiths College, University of London, 
UK. His main research interest is Buddhist ethics, especially theoretical foundations and normative 
applications, with particular reference to medicine and biotechnology. He has published widely on 
Buddhist ethics and related subjects. 
There is no orthodoxy among Buddhists on the questions raised by this scenario. The subject has 
been little studied and there is little in the way of position papers by Buddhist groups or statements 
by authoritative teachers to guide the laity.4–6 In general, in Asia, Buddhist monks avoid 
commenting on lay matters, particularly those involving reproduction, regarding them as 
inappropriate for celibate practitioners who have renounced worldly life. In the West, both Buddhist 
monks and lay Buddhists are more prepared to venture an opinion, but there is still very little in the 
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way of informed comment. In general, bioethics remains a field of mainly Christian expertise, and 
Asian religions have contributed very little to the contemporary debate. 
 
The mainstream Buddhist view, as set out in the oldest recorded scriptures such as the Pali Canon 
(committed to writing in the first century BCE), is that individual human life begins at fertilization 
and that any interference with its development from that point on is a breach of the First Precept, 
which forbids causing harm or injury to living creatures (human and other). Since Buddhists believe 
in reincarnation, the new life that comes into being at fertilization is simply an old one being 
recycled. This makes it difficult to ground arguments to the effect that moral protection should only 
be afforded from a subsequent point of embryonic development when further capacities, such as 
sentience, for example, are present. Given the clarity of the Buddhist position on embryology and its 
emphasis on non-violence (ahimsa) as a basic moral principle, the general stance it adopts on 
reproductive medicine is a conservative one.5 
Applying these observations to the scenario in question, the first general comment would be that as 
Buddhists Robert and Sue should not have embarked on a course of IVF treatment, which envisaged 
the creation and destruction of spare embryos as part of the programme. There is no Buddhist 
objection to IVF as a technique in itself: since Buddhists do not believe in God they do not see the 
creation of life in the laboratory as raising theological problems. Indeed, if all fertilized embryos 
were implanted it would be hard to see any Buddhist objection to the technique. However, since this 
is rarely the case, as in the present instance, Robert and Sue now face a dilemma which cannot be 
resolved within the moral teachings of their faith. 
As regards the options that are now available to the couple, the problem is to determine which of 
the three provides the ‘least worst’ solution. Option one, destroying the embryos, is ruled out by the 
First Precept. In terms of Buddhist teachings – clearly stated in authoritative commentaries – there is 
no moral difference between destroying an embryo and taking the life of an adult. Regarding option 
three, while Sue's compassionate motive of helping other couples through the research is 
commendable, it would not justify the deliberate destruction of life as a means to achieve her good 
end. This leaves only option two, donating the embryos to another couple. This must be the 
preferred option here since it does not involve taking life. However, it is not an ideal solution since 
the separation of children from their genetic parents destroys a natural bond, and children have a 
right to expect to be brought up in a loving family cared for by the parents who conceived them. 
From a Buddhist point of view, furthermore, there is a teaching well attested in scripture that the 
family into which one is born may be determined by karmic causes. Thwarting one's karmic destiny 
is regarded as unwise, and so in normal circumstances it would be seen as preferable for children to 
be raised by their genetic parents rather than given up for adoption. 
The above represents the traditional position. Some schools of Buddhism, typically those belonging 
to the Mahayana tradition prevalent in the countries of North Asia such as Tibet, China, Japan and 
Korea,6 may allow the virtue of compassion (karuna) to attenuate the strictness of the First Precept 
and regard experimentation for humanitarian reasons as permissible. It is difficult to generalize, and 
the majority would probably not adopt this interpretation. A more liberal reading of the ancient 
teachings is not uncommonly promulgated by Western lay Buddhists. Some of these have sought to 
justify abortion along these lines, so it would not be surprising to see similar arguments employed in 
the context of embryo research. However, the weight of tradition on the whole is against such 
liberalization. 
 
A Catholic perspective 
Associate Professor Bernadette Tobin is Director of the Plunkett Centre for Ethics at St Vincent's 
Hospital, Sydney, Australia, and Reader in Philosophy at Australian Catholic University. Dr Tobin is 
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Honorary Ethicist at the Children's Hospital at Westmead, Honorary Associate Professor in the 
Faculty of Medicine at the University of Sydney, and Conjoint Associate Professor in the School of 
Medicine at the University of New South Wales. 
We are not told whether Richard and Sue sought advice about Catholic teaching on IVF before they 
decided to use it to have children. This teaching, as it applies to their circumstances,7 can be 
summarized as follows. The Church first reminds Catholics that the desire for children forms only a 
part of what needs to be taken into account in the moral evaluation of any form of IVF. The process 
of procreation cannot ‘borrow’ its moral quality from that desire: it must also be evaluated in itself. 
The Church then teaches that the process of IVF, in which fertilization ‘is brought about outside the 
bodies of the couple through actions of third parties whose competence and technical activity 
determine the success of the procedure establishes the domination of technology over the origin 
and destiny of the human person’ and that this ‘relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the 
dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children’. The Church concludes that only 
the ‘act of conjugal love’ is a ‘setting worthy of human procreation’. In short, a child should be the 
fruit of an act of marital sexual intercourse.8 It should be noted that some Catholic theolgians 
challenge this application of traditional Catholic teaching to the so-called ‘simple case’ of IVF.9 
Robert and Sue would hardly need to be told that their three children are the ‘gifts’ and ‘blessings of 
God’.10 But perhaps they do need reminding that this is also true of their four remaining embryos 
(an idea that Sue seems intuitively to discern for herself in her ‘acute awareness’ that her three 
children were all once embryos themselves). When the Church speaks of the inviolability of an 
innocent human being's right to life from the moment of conception until death, it inevitably 
addresses the question of the status of the embryo. But the emphasis of the teaching is on how the 
human embryo ought to be respected and treated – as a person. So a Catholic adviser would 
certainly try, with (it is to be hoped) sensitivity to their current circumstances, to help Robert and 
Sue to reflect on the grave ethical dilemma their actions have generated, to which there is no 
unproblematic solution. Reconsidering their view that they have completed their family and asked to 
consider having the embryos implanted, over time, in Sue's uterus, would require further indignities 
to the embryo involved in IVF procedures. But continued cryopreservation would fail to respect the 
personhood of the embryo. 
Although Sue's wish to help others who suffer from infertility is admirable, a Catholic adviser would 
encourage her to see for herself that the worthy goal of scientific research into infertility ought not 
to be sought by any available means, in particular that it ought not to be sought by activities that 
destroy human embryos. The end does not justify the means, the adviser might say. 
So what are Robert and Sue to do? Giving up the embryos for adoption by another couple or couples 
who are prepared to bring them to birth and look after them as their own children would have the 
merit of saving these embryonic children and demonstrating reverence for their lives. But the 
adviser would have to admit that it is currently a matter of debate among Catholic theologians 
whether it is legitimate for another couple to adopt ‘orphan’ embryos.11 
Most Catholic thinkers would argue that the only other option that truly honours the personhood of 
these human embryos that is now available to Robert and Sue is to have the embryos thawed, 
rehydrated, returned to their natural living state, and given appropriate marks of human and 
religious respect as they succumb to death. In so doing, Robert and Sue would not be seeking to 
destroy the embryos, but would be allowing them to die in circumstances in which there is no 
ethically sound way of maintaining their lives.12 In fact, Robert and Sue should insist that they will 
not permit any deliberate destruction of these embryos, not even as they die. 
A Hindu perspective 
Dr Swasti Bhattacharyya is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion in the School of Social 
Science, Philosophy and Religion at Buena Vista University, Storm Lake, Iowa, USA. She is author of 
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Magical Progeny, Modern Technology: A Hindu Bioethics of Assisted Reproductive Technology (State 
University of New York Press, 2006), and has contributed articles and chapters to various books and 
journals. 
Like most religious traditions, Hinduism is not monolithic. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
the term ‘Hinduism’ was originally used as both a geographical and a religious indicator for those 
who lived east of the Indus River, a natural border in Northwest India. From the very beginning, 
theological unity, a central leader, or a text were not elements that defined Hinduism. However, 
there are a number of principles shared by many of those who self-identify as Hindu that can 
provide insights into Sue and Robert's case. 
Just like Sue and Robert, central characters within the Mahabharata13 – Kunti and her husband King 
Pandu, and Gandhari and her husband King Dhirtarashtra – struggle with infertility.14 Like Sue and 
Robert, these mythical characters also take action to circumvent their inability to have children. 
Kunti gives birth to sons by utilizing a special mantra given to her; a mantra that obligates the gods 
she calls upon to come and impregnate her. Gandhari's children are also born thanks to 
extraordinary actions. Having been pregnant for two years, Gandhari delivers a dark, solid mass of 
flesh. Following orders, she sprinkles the products of conception with water, and the mass falls apart 
into 100 embryos, each of which are the size of a thumb joint. Each is incubated in clay pots filled 
with ghee (clarified butter). 
In Kunti and Gandhari's stories and other texts such as Bhagavad Gita and the Laws of Manu, we find 
central principles that contextualize human actions that are relevant to Sue and Robert's case. First, 
there is a regard for society, attention to how our actions relate to the needs of society as a whole. 
Second, within this context of society, there are the responsibilities and flexibility of dharma. While 
dharma is multifaceted and context-specific, it ultimately relates to our actions, roles and 
responsibilities within our community. Dharma may not provide universal guidelines for everyone, 
but it does guide each individual to carefully examine a particular situation and determine what 
might be the best course of action. Finally, while some may fear that the non-universal, context-
specific nature of dharma leads to an irresponsible ‘anything goes’ attitude, the theories of karma 
and a commitment to ahimsa (non-violence) actually hold each person to the highest level of 
accountability. 
While karma is often understood as fatalistic or negative, it is neither. Karma is action, actions that 
are followed by results. The Bhagavad Gita calls on us to act while not being attached to our actions 
or to the fruits of our actions.15 Acting without attachment becomes a guiding principle that directly 
influences how we ought to act. Greedy, self-centred actions are impossible to perform if we are not 
attached to our actions. Additionally, by acting out of a commitment to ahimsa, we again find 
guidelines for how we are to act. 
As we apply to Sue and Robert's case the above ‘Hindu’ principles as illuminated through the 
Mahabharata's stories, we find a number of parallels. There is an acceptance of human creativity, of 
technology if you will, as suggested by Gandhari's machinations. There is an understanding of the 
desire, or dharma, to have children and be parents, as we see Kunti and Pandu utilize the mantra to 
fulfill their desire to have children. However, their use of the mantra was tempered with their 
societal responsibilities. Since they knew that the god Dharma, the god of order, merit and 
righteousness, would refuse to participate in their plan if it was unlawful and against societal norms, 
they called upon him first. So too should Sue and Robert consider the needs of society as they move 
forward. 
The principles of dharma, karma and ahimsa acknowledge the difficult struggle regarding what Sue 
and Robert should do with the remaining embryos. The couple understands these embryos are not 
mere tissue, but potential humans, for the three children they now have were once embryos. A 
commitment to ahimsa places value on life, in its variety of forms, and aims to do the least amount 
of harm possible. To this end, Sue and Robert are hesitant to simply destroy them. Sue's desire to 
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donate them for infertility research to help others is considering the larger societal needs while at 
the same time doing the least amount of harm. The principles discussed here would also not 
preclude them from donating the embryos to another infertile couple. Indeed, if Sue and Robert 
were to act without attachments, they could donate the remaining embryos both to other couples 
and for further research. 
An Islamic perspective 
Professor Abdulaziz Sachedina is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia, USA. His 
PhD is from the University of Toronto. He has been visiting professor at Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo and 
McGill Universities in Canada, Haverford College and the University of Jordan, Amman. He has 
lectured widely in East Africa, India, Pakistan, Europe and the Middle East. He contributed to Human 
Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty (University 
of South Carolina Press, 1988) and has authored Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). He is author of a chapter titled ‘Human Clones: An Islamic View’ in 
The Human Cloning Debate, edited by Glenn McGee (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Hills Books, 1998). He is 
presently working on a major study on Islamic Law for Muslim Physicians: The Spiritual Foundations 
of Biomedical Ethics in Islam (forthcoming 2012). 
Islamic legal–ethical tradition is based on scriptural sources that include the Qur'an and the Tradition 
(sunna). In order to deduce any prescriptive ruling, Muslim scholars search for a precedent in these 
two sources. When these sources are silent on a matter, then two principles are applied to deduce a 
ruling. These are maslaha (Public Good) and la darar wa la dirar (no harm no harassment). 
Consideration of public interest or the common good has long been utilized by Muslim jurists for 
accommodating and incorporating new issues confronting the community and is used as a rational 
principle to derive new rulings out of concern for the interests and welfare of the community. This is 
justified on the ground that it is provided for in the revealed text where the objectives of the sacred 
law – the Shari'a – are: protecting the people's religion, lives (nufus), reason (uqul), lineage (nasl) 
and property (mal). 
In relation to what advice should be given to Robert and Sue about what they should do with their 
‘surplus’ IVF embryos, Muslim jurists' primary concern is the ethical–legal status of the embryo prior 
to implantation in the uterus. While rulings relating to this question are generally deduced from the 
precedents that deal with fetal sanctity, the legal–ethical status of the preimplantation embryo 
remains unclear as there is no clear definition of embryo or fetus in the Muslim juridical tradition 
and ARTs have succeeded in making possible what is impossible in nature, creating entities and 
situations previously unaddressed by Muslim scholars. These new technologies have, therefore, 
raised challenges not only to human dignity and respect for the sanctity of life, but for Muslim 
rulings on the embryo, fetus and attainment of personhood (which is established much later in the 
gestational period). The questions await responsible treatment by Muslim scholars. 
Donating a fertilized ‘surplus’ embryo to another couple is out of the question as the child must be 
connected to the biological parents. The preservation of proper lineage, as stated above, is one of 
the main purposes of the Shari'a. Guaranteeing a child's untainted identity through legitimate 
conjugal relationship between a man and a woman in marriage is so essential in Islam and Muslim 
culture that it is regarded as a child's inalienable right. Proper lineage in Muslim culture, as we learn 
from several rulings prohibiting or questioning different forms of ARTs outside proper (legal Muslim) 
marriage, is critical in forging an appropriate relationship between the parents and the child, and in 
claiming rights that accrue to the child in the Shari'a. 
There are, however, issues other than lineage that may determine how Muslim scholars would rule 
in relation to embryo donation, which relate to the hermeneutic possibility that life begins following 
‘ensoulment’ (usually after first trimester). Qur'anic references to the embryonic ‘journey’ to 
personhood suggest a later ensoulment, leading many jurists to conclude that at the conception the 
conceptus is less than a ‘full human’ person. Moreover, when it comes to protection and rights of 
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the embryo, it is generally ‘the implanted zygote’ that is accorded the status of rights bearer. Many 
prominent Muslim scholars do not apply sanctity of life principles to embryos outside of the womb 
and juridicial rulings may, therefore, argue on the basis of ‘public good’ that frozen embryos are not 
‘rights bearers’, and stem cell research is permissible since it provides the possibility of discovering 
cures for incurable disease. The donation of embryos for research therefore is acceptable. 
Issues relating to lineage, to the ‘placement’ of the embryo within a family and to the ‘ownership’ of 
an embryo also become important in relation to the possible use of frozen embryos by a woman 
following the death of her husband. It is unclear whether the frozen embryos are really ‘property’ in 
the usual sense of the word. For while there is no doubt that when both father and mother are alive, 
both have a right to determine the use of their embryos, it is unclear what happens when one party 
dies. Indeed, it could be argued that following the death of the husband, the contract of the woman 
wedded to him becomes invalid and she is no more his wife. Hence, the newborn could not use his 
name as part of her/his identity. 
Indeed, as the Qur'an and the Tradition regard perceivable human life as commencing at later stages 
in the biological development of the embryo and fetus, and (before, at least, the first trimester of 
pregnancy) there is hardly any consideration given to the moral culpability of embryo destruction, 
Muslim jurists tend to ignore perceived ethical dilemmas concerning the donation of embryos for 
research purposes. Furthermore, the silence of the Qur'an regarding the criterion for moral status of 
the fetus allows jurists to make distinctions between a biological and moral person, and between the 
frozen IVF embryo and the in utero embryo enabling the donation of ‘surplus’ embryos for use in 
stem cell research. 
A Jewish perspective 
Dr Lisa Soleymani Lehmann is the Director of the Center for Bioethics at Brigham and Women's 
Hospital and Assistant Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, USA. Dr Lehmann is a 
graduate of Cornell University and the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. She completed 
her residency training in internal medicine at Johns Hopkins Hospital and a PhD in Philosophy at 
Johns Hopkins University. She studied Talmud at Midreshet Lindenbaum and Drisha Institute. Her 
research is focused on empirical and philosophical analysis of contemporary ethical issues in 
medicine. She is an active member of the Brigham and Women's Hospital Ethics Consultation Service 
and Ethics committee. 
The case of Robert and Sue raises a series of challenging ethical questions that confront infertile 
couples. In this commentary I present what I believe to be the dominant Jewish perspective on these 
questions, while noting the diversity of opinions that exist within Judaism. I shall argue that (1) 
Judaism not only permits the use of ARTs, but that when a couple cannot conceive a child through 
sexual intercourse, ARTs are encouraged; (2) the majority opinion within Judaism does not assign 
significant moral status to an embryo prior to 40 days of gestation and prior to implantation within a 
uterus; and (3) Judaism would encourage couples who have spare embryos to donate their embryos 
to other infertile couples. 
Judaism places a very high value on having children and all Jewish men have a biblically rooted 
obligation to procreate that is fulfilled by having two children. Couples are, however, encouraged to 
have as many children as possible for children are also considered a blessing. Although Judaism 
generally encourages ARTs, not all approaches to infertility are considered equally permissible. From 
a Jewish perspective IVF would be most acceptable when it used Sue's eggs and Robert's sperm to 
overcome their infertility. The concern with this scenario is the method by which Robert's sperm is 
obtained. There is a minority position that masturbation in order to obtain sperm for ARTs is a 
violation of the prohibition ‘not to destroy seed in vain’.16 Most rabbinic authorities, however, 
argue that procuring sperm for the purposes of creating a child is not ‘in vain’.17 Those who disagree 
with this interpretation of ‘in vain’ prefer that sperm be collected from a woman's vaginal canal after 
intercourse. The use of ARTs with donor sperm is more controversial. Questions arise about whether 
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such a procedure constitutes adultery and the possibility of incest between children of the same 
sperm donors who have different mothers. Despite these concerns, prominent authorities permit 
the use of donor sperm.18 
To guide Robert and Sue on the question of what to do with their spare embryos, it is first necessary 
to understand the moral status of an embryo within Judaism. In Jewish law, an embryo is considered 
to be ‘mere water’ until the 40th day of gestation.19 This view of an embryo leaves room for the use 
of some embryos for research.20 Furthermore, an embryo that is outside of a uterus cannot develop 
into a human being and thus it is not owed the same respect as an embryo that is implanted within a 
uterus.21 
Since Robert and Sue's embryos exist outside of a uterus, from a Jewish perspective it is morally 
permissible to use these embryos for research even though that research will lead to the destruction 
of the embryos. As I understand it, however, Robert and Sue have four options of what to do with 
their embryos. They could destroy them, cryopreserve them, donate them for research or donate 
them to an infertile couple. From a Jewish perspective all of their options are not ethically 
equivalent. In Judaism there is a general biblical prohibition against waste, bal tashchit.22 Destroying 
embryos that could be used for life-saving research or that could be used to produce life would 
clearly be a violation of this prohibition. The alternative of cryopreservation would be preferable to 
the immediate destruction of the embryos. Although Robert and Sue believe that they have 
completed their family, they should be counselled on the possibility of a change of heart. They might 
confront the tragic situation of one of their living children dying or needing a life-saving bone 
marrow transplant. They might consider creating another child who could be a perfect match for 
their ill child. Although this scenario raises other ethical questions, from the perspective of Jewish 
law it would be permissible. It is possible that they should keep their options for another child open 
until they approach the five-year limit and at that time make a decision to either donate the 
embryos to another couple or to research. 
The third alternative of donating the embryos to research is a laudatory choice and one that would 
be ethically permissible.23 The use of embryos for research holds the promise of disease prevention, 
improved treatment and the possibility of curing disease. The potential of this research to alleviate 
human suffering and save life is understood as religious duty. The alleviation of human suffering 
through the advancement of scientific research, however, is not imminent. It will take years before 
the advances from embryo research are translated into clinically significant implications for patients. 
Robert and Sue have the opportunity to immediately alleviate the human suffering of other infertile 
couples by donating their embryos to other couples. From a Jewish perspective, donating embryos 
to other infertile couples is the preferable option. This option is consistent with the general belief 
within Judaism that children are a blessing. Robert and Sue would thus be doing an act of chesed, 
loving kindness, by assisting other infertile couples to have children. The donation of embryos to 
other couples would result in the immediate relief of human suffering and in so doing would help 
couples fulfil their religious obligation to procreate. The centrality of having children within Judaism 
and the opportunity to relieve human suffering while helping others fulfil a religious duty to 
procreate are reasons why the option of donating embryos to infertile couples is preferable to 
donating embryos to research. 
There is no doubt that some couples will find the option of donating their embryos to infertile 
couples difficult. The idea of having genetically related offspring with whom Robert and Sue do not 
have a relationship may create a host of psychosocial issues. These concerns should be discussed 
within the context of an understanding of the chesed, which Robert and Sue are doing by helping 
infertile couples. Although Judaism would encourage the donation of embryos to other couples, this 
would not be obligatory. Thus, couples who are uncomfortable with this option should be 
encouraged to donate their embryos for research. 
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An Evangelical–Protestant Perspective 
Rev Dr Brian Edgar is Professor of Theological Studies at Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore, 
Kentucky, USA. He is a Fellow of The Institute for the Study of Christianity in an Age of Science and 
Technology and a member of the World Evangelical Alliance Theological Commission. Brian was 
previously Director of Public Theology for the Australian Evangelical Alliance and lectured in theology 
and ethics for 18 years at the Bible College of Victoria where he was also Academic Dean. Dr Edgar is 
the winner of three Templeton awards for published writing in the area of science and theology. He 
lives in Wilmore, KY and Melbourne, Australia. 
Protestant perspectives on the ethical issues which Robert and Sue are facing will be derived from 
principles and convictions derived from three fundamental Reformation principles: sola scriptura, 
sola fidei and sola gratia.24 Robert and Sue have chosen to utilize ARTs to develop their family. It 
should be pointed out, firstly, that a biblical evaluation of marriage does not reckon childless couples 
to be inferior in any way. Nonetheless, the use of technology to allow a marriage to achieve the 
good of procreation is not necessarily considered as an instance of an unwarranted ‘playing God’ but 
rather as a form of ‘stewardship’ and an appropriate use of technology to overcome a physiological 
failure that inhibits the good of procreation.25 
It appears that Robert and Sue have not previously considered all the implications of the use of 
ARTs. The good that is achieved for the family requires an acceptance of the appropriateness of the 
loss of embryonic life (in research and the reproductive process) as well as a decision about ‘excess’ 
embryos. The loss of embryonic life may be justified analogously with the loss of embryonic life in 
natural conception but some will not find that acceptable, given the moral status of the embryo. 
At the level of individual life there are significant concerns about the embryo which is, undeniably, a 
stage in development of a human being. Some will see a distinction between personhood and 
physical form and thus will approve of destructive research up to, often, 14 days (which is the time 
of formation of the primitive streak – the precursor of the central nervous system). But just as there 
is no scientific rationale for saying that the embryo becomes a new entity at implantation, there is 
no theological justification for believing embryos to be fundamentally morally transformed at that, 
or any other, point. To define embryos purely from a scientific point of view as merely a collection of 
cells or a genetic entity produces an impoverished view of humanity. There is no understanding of 
humanity apart from the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As a being made in the 
‘image of God’ (Genesis 1:26) and ultimately being conformed to the image of Jesus (Romans 8:29), 
the embryo exists in relationship with God. An embryo may not have ‘personality’ but it has 
‘personhood’ in the sense of that quality or attribute, which constitutes the fundamental identity of 
every human entity. It should not be treated merely as a means to an end.26 Although it may at 
times receive differential treatment (when, hypothetically, in conflict with the life of the woman 
carrying it) it ought to be exempt from that utilitarian cost–benefit analysis, often associated with 
justifying destructive research at up to 14 days (which, if utilized, also necessarily justifies research 
well beyond that point). 
At the level of the family there are concerns about the use of technology to re-form family 
structures. Approval of the use of ARTs in Robert and Sue's family situation does not necessarily 
imply endorsement of the use of other (e.g. donor) forms of ARTs. The use of donated embryos is 
not analogous to adoption, where the intent is to provide families for children, rather than children 
for families. Some will justify donation as an instance of profound grace and love (a), a generous gift 
from one couple to another, and will define families in terms of the inner depth of relationships (b) 
(love, care, companionship and commitment) rather than in terms of a fixed structure of 
relationships (genetic relationship, man–woman, parent–child). It may also be seen as another 
example of the redemptive healing of infertility (c). 
However, it can be argued27 against (c) that this is not healing so much as finding an alternative, 
compensating solution28 which, contra (b), disrupts families by introducing a connection with 
10 |  P a g e
 
another couple who cannot easily be divorced from legitimate interest (concerning genetic history, 
family relationships, welfare, etc.) in the child, except by the complete commodification and 
depersonalization of the embryo. In addition, (a) focuses on the needs of the parents and does not 
address the good of the children who are no longer the good that is sought (as in normal 
procreation) but have become the means to the good of the infertile couple. In such a situation, it is 
only logical that such children are formed in such a way as to maximize the good of the parents at 
end. This actually begins immediately with the selection of the best embryos for implantation and 
ends, ultimately, with ‘designer children’. The ‘excess’ embryos are best treated like those that 
naturally pass away in the process of conception, rather than as a means to some other end. 
In countering the modern emphasis on the rights of the individual (either the embryo or the 
parents), it is also important to reflect on the broader social implications of the technology.29 On 
the one hand, technologies can operate redemptively, but they can also seduce us into putting our 
real trust in human ingenuity and mastery of nature. Having created technology to shape the world 
it then turns and shapes our society, our values and our relationships. The problem is the absence of 
an agreed philosophical or theological framework on which society can adequately consider the 
implications of these new developments. This is more the result of a failure of theology to captivate 
the minds of people, and the failure of the church to model a way of life that is a genuine alternative 
to the technique-ism so powerfully present in modern society. 
Sue and Robert should ensure that they become fully informed and, while being aware of cultural 
trends and legislative principles, their primary need is to take seriously their responsibility as 
Christians. They should pray and seek wisdom, examine their motives, listen to counsel and make 
themselves aware of the corporate wisdom of the church – even if it is somewhat varied. In 
particular, they need to be formed in their view by biblical principles and virtues. 
Discussion 
Our world view helps us to make sense of our experience and relationships on a personal level, and 
it also shapes attitudes and moral responses to issues of public importance. For many people, 
spiritual or religious beliefs are a major feature and a major determinant of their world view; they 
are a fundamental part of both personal and social existence, and they are brought to bear in 
decisions about medical and scientific issues of moral import. In pluralist societies, health-care 
professionals and policy-makers should understand that religious beliefs, values and practices may 
vary within and between religious traditions. It also helps to understand how religious approaches to 
medicine, health policy and bioethics may differ from secular approaches. This is no simple task, 
however, as many religious traditions are inaccessible to other world views and are not structured to 
address – and do not speak with clarity or precision about – specific ethical issues arising from the 
application (or potential application) of medical science and modern technology to human needs 
and experience, such as infertility. They rely instead on the nuanced application of general principles 
or analogies, or interpretations of sacred texts. The commentaries in this article provide clues as to 
how one may better appreciate the relevance of faith to health and policy decisions and understand 
the points of commonality and tension with contemporary medicine and secular bioethics. 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between medicine and faith traditions with regards to ART is 
the degree to which they accept its use to overcome infertility. In most liberal democracies, ART is a 
well-accepted response to infertility – to the extent that most debate concerns not its intrinsic 
morality but the extent to which it should be funded from the public purse. In contrast, the Catholic 
and Buddhist perspectives are highly antipathetic to the use of ART. The Protestant perspective is 
open to the use of ART but contests the moral basis of donor gametes. The Jewish perspective 
accepts ART so long as certain prohibitions are observed. The Hindu perspective is open to the use of 
this (and most other) biomedical interventions. Finally, the Islamic perspective leaves ART as an 
open question awaiting a response from Muslim scholars. These differences are fundamental to 
consideration of the issues surrounding the donation of ‘excess’ ART embryos for research, as they 
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provide the broad context in which such decisions are made and indicate the cultural dynamic that 
may surround Robert and Sue. 
But it is also clear from these commentaries that religious perspectives on ART share with medicine, 
and with secular bioethics, an account of ART that takes into consideration more than simply the 
moral status of the embryo. In each case a complex range of considerations influence the way that 
decisions about ART and embryo donation are evaluated. In medicine, empirical research has clearly 
demonstrated that a number of psychological, social, economic, cultural and moral concerns 
influence the decisions that women make about the fate of excess embryos.1–3 Bioethics, in turn, 
no longer sees reproductive issues simply in terms of the moral status of the embryo/fetus or as 
conflict between a women's right of bodily authority and an embryo's or fetus's right to life.30 
Likewise, it is clear from these commentaries that while religious traditions emphasize the moral 
status of the embryo they also share a number of other concerns, or features, including reference to 
distinct cosmologies, reference to scriptural and religious authorities, incorporation of specific 
norms relating to the family, and the use of particular moral concepts that take the form of both 
prohibitions and positive exhortations. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the commentaries differ markedly with regards to the moral status of the 
embryo. The Buddhist commentary rests on an explicit ontological claim – human life begins at 
fertilization (although it does not begin so much as continue through reincarnation). The Catholic 
commentary appears not to rest on an ontological claim, for the embryo should be treated as a 
person from conception, and whether the embryo is a person or a being with a soul is (we are told) a 
point on which the Catholic church has no formal teaching. The Protestant perspective similarly 
appears to turn not on what the embryo is, but on how it should be treated (i.e. not as a means). In 
both cases, however, these moral norms conceal a basic ontological claim that emerges from 
Christian cosmology, as embryos should be treated in some ways and not others because of what 
they are (i.e. divine gifts fashioned in the image of god). According to the Islamic perspective, 
‘ensoulment’ occurs after first trimester, so before this event the embryo is less than a full person. 
Its moral status is also affected by its location, as outside the womb it has less moral status than it 
does in utero. The Jewish perspective is similar, both in terms of the importance attributed to 
location, and to the biological threshold of personhood, which in Jewish faith is crossed at 40 days' 
gestation. In the Hindu perspective the embryo is described simply as a ‘potential’ human being. 
Each of the normative positions arrived at by our commentators, particularly those relating to the 
moral status of the embryo, can be linked to religious cosmologies. This is most explicit in the 
Buddhist perspective: the concepts of reincarnation and Karma, the moral status of the embryo and 
the prohibition on destroying it are all clearly linked. Similarly, in the Islamic perspective, there is a 
clear link between the concept of ensoulment and what actions are or are not allowed with respect 
to embryos. In the Hindu commentary, the concept of dharma (which has cosmological significance) 
is used to explain the motivation to have children in the first place. The normative position with 
respect to the case under discussion is established chiefly with reference to moral concepts of non-
violence and non-attachment, however, rather than linking the case to Hindu cosmology. The 
Protestant commentary references cosmology through the Christian story of creation (Genesis) and 
the life of Christ, which dictates how we can or cannot treat an embryo. The Catholic perspective 
invokes the beneficence of a Christian god by construing children as ‘loving gifts of divine goodness’. 
Again, this is what dictates how they ought to be treated, so there is a link between cosmology and 
normative conclusion. The cosmological link in the Jewish commentary perhaps needs to be 
inferred: Jews are said to have a ‘Biblically rooted obligation’ to procreate, which presumably relates 
to their status as a chosen people. 
The religious perspectives also differ according to the emphasis they place on particular loci of 
authority (scripture, tradition and social roles and reasoning). The Buddhist commentary refers to 
the Pali Canon, the Catholic commentary to the official teachings of the Church, the Hindu 
commentary to a story from the Mahabharata (which is used not so much as a source of moral 
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prescriptions and prohibitions as a narrative that models culturally valued ways of behaving), the 
Islamic commentary to the Qur'an, the Jewish perspective to the Old Testament and the Evangelical 
Protestant to the Bible and to the principles of the Protestant reformation. 
At the same time that they reference scriptural authorities, the commentaries all refer to non-
scriptural authorities and/or to social functionaries or social roles. So, for example, the Buddhist 
commentary refers to monks, the Catholic commentary to the roles occupied by theologians, clerical 
authorities (chiefly the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith) and ‘Catholic advisors’, the Islamic 
commentary to the Muslim scholars and jurists responsible for Shari'a law, and the Jewish 
commentary to Rabbinic authority. In contrast, the Evangelical Protestant perspective is partly 
founded on the rejection of clerical authority, although it urges couples to make themselves aware 
of the ‘corporate wisdom of the church’. Notably, there is also no mention of religious roles in the 
Hindu commentary. 
Each of the commentaries also ground their positions with regards to embryo donation or 
destruction on moral concepts constructed as exhortations, or, more commonly, as prohibitions. The 
Buddhist commentary foregrounds the First Precept (ahimsa), which proscribes violence towards all 
other forms of life. The Hindu perspective also refers to the principle of non-violence (ahimsa) and to 
the principle of non-attachment. The Catholic and Protestant perspectives invoke prohibitions on 
using human life as a means rather than an end in itself. The Catholic perspective also explicitly 
proscribes deliberate destruction of human life. In the Islamic perspective, we find a prohibition that 
is described as ‘no harm no harassment’. And in the Jewish perspective, we find reference to 
prohibitions on masturbation, incest, adultery and waste. As well as telling you what you can't do, 
each of the religious traditions described in these commentaries encourages the faithful to be, or to 
act, in a certain way. The Buddhist perspective mentions karuna (compassion) in connection with the 
Mahayana tradition. The Catholic perspective emphasizes respect for personhood, which includes 
positive actions (e.g. ‘bringing to birth and looking after’) as well as prohibitions. The Hindu 
commentary alludes to ‘regard for society’, dharma (manifesting as desire to produce children and 
parent them) and action (karma). The Islamic commentary invokes maslaha (public good) and the 
Jewish commentary mentions an exhortation to undertake acts of loving kindness (chesed). The 
Protestant commentary lists a set of positive Christian obligations such as praying, seeking wisdom, 
taking council and listening to your church. 
While the characteristics described above may come as no surprise, it is, perhaps, less obvious that 
the six commentaries all inscribe social norms about families, and inscribe these with differing 
degrees of strength. In the Buddhist commentary they are inscribed very strongly: separation of 
children from genetic parents destroys a natural bond, as children have a right to expect to be 
brought up by parents who conceived them. (Under this norm, one would expect that, as a means of 
creating a family, adoption would be as problematic as embryo donation.) In the Islamic perspective, 
norms about the family are established through biological parenthood and patrilineal descent. The 
child should be born from a ‘legitimate conjugal relationship between a man and woman in 
marriage’ and remain connected to its biological parents. If the marriage ends (e.g. by the death of 
the father), the line of descent is broken and the name of the father may not be used to identify the 
child. The Catholic commentary stipulates that ‘a child should be the fruit of an act of marital sexual 
intercourse’. Like the Buddhist and Islamic perspective, this prescribes a very specific notion of 
family as a social formation composed of biological parents and offspring. This is of particular 
relevance to ART as this technology has made possible many other social formations, formulations 
that clearly fall foul of these norms. Norms about families are somewhat less strongly articulated in 
the remaining commentaries. The Jewish perspective makes it clear that couples should procreate. 
While the Protestant perspective states that the Bible does not evaluate childless couples as inferior, 
it does show a concern for the separateness of families that is ‘disrupted’ by multiplying the parents. 
The Hindu perspective is the least prescriptive about norms of the family, but it stresses that social 
norms need at least to be negotiated in accordance with dharma. The fact that faith traditions 
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connote particular normative ideas about family, gender relations and procreation is highly relevant 
in relation to ART as it is these ideals and norms, rather than any particular value or meaning 
ascribed to the embryo, that may determine what decisions may or may not be made about 
embryos and fetuses. 
If one takes all of these considerations into account, it is possible to suggest that from a religious 
perspective, the deliberate destruction of excess ART embryos appears to be the most problematic 
option available to Robert and Sue as it is acceptable only from one of the six perspectives. Donation 
for the purposes of research appears to be an option for those who identify with Hindu, Islamic and 
Jewish faith traditions, but this is a highly problematic option for those within Catholic and Buddhist 
communities (insofar as the latter engage with such issues at all). Donation of spare embryos for 
reproduction is most problematic in Islam, and is subject to ongoing consideration by Catholic 
authorities and by Catholic organizations, some of which promote the ‘adoption’ of surplus embryos 
to prevent their destruction.31 This option would, however, appear to be acceptable in Hindu and 
Jewish communities, and may be regarded as the ‘least worst’ option from a Buddhist perspective 
(although the resulting family would transgress strong norms). 
Each of our commentators has addressed how faith traditions would ‘deal’ with embryos that are 
judged to be ‘surplus’ to a couple's reproductive needs. In this regard, it is worth noting that the 
case study provides no indication of any discussions with Robert and Sue prior to their use of ART 
about the possibility of having ‘surplus’ embryos or the options that would be available to them in 
that case. From the available literature on counselling associated with ARTs, it seems clear that 
omission of such discussions is fairly common. As the commentaries underscore, practitioners 
should foster open and tolerant discourse beginning from the earliest stages of ART and include 
discussion of the social, cultural and religious factors that might influence a couple's decision-making 
with regard to the fate of surplus embryos. The insights provided by our commentators are 
invaluable in understanding the importance of faith in shaping world views, including the way that 
believers may confront decisions about the treatment of infertility. It is essential that health 
professionals do not assume, however, that knowing the faith tradition that a person identifies with 
is sufficient to predict their specific beliefs, practices and decisions. Religious traditions are often 
enormously complex and heterogeneous and vary across different cultures. In addition, there may 
be a discontinuity between the official teaching of a religious tradition and the personal convictions 
of adherents to that tradition with respect to specific issues or situations. For these reasons, while 
health professionals should be aware of, and sensitive to, the beliefs and values of their patients, 
this can never be a substitute for open, ongoing and tolerant discourse. 
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